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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arose from a real estate investment and 
development scheme based on the island of St. Croix in the 
United States Virgin Islands.  The OMEI Group (“OMEI”), 
Ocean View Investment Holdings, LLC (“Ocean View”), 
Lucy Cheng, and Mait Dubois (collectively, the “Appellants”) 
ask us to reverse a ruling of the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands denying their motion for summary judgment on 
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claims of misrepresentation brought by Frank Pollara and his 
construction company, the Frank C. Pollara Group.  Because 
the summary judgment motion did not present a pure question 
of law and because the Appellants failed to properly preserve 
the factual issues they now endeavor to raise, we conclude 
that we cannot review the District Court’s ruling on that 
motion.  We can, however, and will affirm the District 
Court’s refusal to set aside the jury verdict awarding Pollara 
and his company compensatory and punitive damages.   
 
I.  Background1  
 
 A.  The Project that Wasn’t 
 
 OMEI is a Delaware limited liability company that 
supposedly served as an investment vehicle for people that 
Lucy Cheng claimed to represent.  Cheng presented herself as 
an investment specialist and an expert in international tax 
matters.  Mait Dubois was her deputy in the management of 
OMEI.  Cheng and Dubois were also the front people for the 
investors in Ocean View,2 an entity established exclusively to 
                                              
 1 These facts are recounted in the light most favorable 
to Pollara, the non-movant, with respect to both the summary 
judgment motion and the motions to set aside the verdict.  See 
infra n.9.  
 
 2 Cheng said that she represented both OMEI’s 
investors and a controlling group of Ocean View investors.  
According to Pollara – and the entities’ operating agreements 
– OMEI’s investors were a smaller subset of the Ocean View 
Investors.  Ocean View was formerly known as Southgate 
Crossing Investments, LLC.   
 4 
 
lend money to yet another entity, Southgate Crossing, LLC, 
which is said to be the “owner” of a real estate development 
known as “Southgate Crossing.”3  Ocean View used inter-
company loans to funnel money to Southgate Development 
Group, LLC (“SDG”), which, in turn, was supposed to 
develop Southgate Crossing. The layers of business entities 
involved in this matter were avowedly meant to insulate the 
investors and the underlying real estate asset from liability 
and to minimize any tax burden.4   
 
 A South Carolina realtor named Rick Willis – who is 
not a party to this action – devised the initial plan for 
Southgate Crossing, which was to purchase 68 acres at Estate 
Southgate on St. Croix, re-zone it to increase the number of 
housing units that could be built on the property, and to then 
subdivide the land, build subdivision infrastructure, and sell 
the individual lots.5   Willis met Cheng at a seminar in 2006 
                                                                                                     
 
 3 Qualifiers like “said to be” and the need to set the 
word “owner” off with quotation marks are a consequence of 
the deliberately obscure record that Cheng and her fellow 
Appellants managed to create in the course of their highly 
dubious business activities. 
 
 4 As the Appellants state in their briefing before us, the 
intent was to make the property “judgment[] proof.”  
(Appellants’ Br. at 4.) 
 
 5 SDG and Southgate Crossing LLC both had the same 
ownership: 50% by Rick Willis, whose role is further 
described herein, and his wife, and 50% by the OMEI 
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and she agreed to become a participant in the project.  When 
Cheng met secretly with her investors, however, she said that 
it was not her intention to develop the land at all, but rather to 
sell it as soon as possible.    
 
 In 2007, Willis was working with an architect, 
Christopher McCarthy, who proposed putting over 200 
houses on the Southgate Crossing property.  Cheng conferred 
with McCarthy sometime around October of 2007 and told 
him that she was in charge of overseeing the project and 
safeguarding the investors’ interests.   She also told McCarthy 
that her “specialty” was manipulating companies to make it 
“look[] like A and run it through so many different 
permutations that it would come out over here as Z.”  (App. at 
541-42.)  After McCarthy created preliminary schematics for 
the proposed development, Cheng made him sign a contract 
that assigned to SDG the copyright to the drawings, before 
she would pay him.  Prior to signing the contract, McCarthy 
had never heard of SDG.  McCarthy explained to Cheng that 
the schematics were not sufficient to obtain building permits.  
They were, he said, just “pretty pictures.”  (App. at 547.)   
 
 By August 2008, Cheng was making all of the 
decisions for the project, but Willis was still involved.  
Around that time, Frank Pollara, a 47-year veteran of the 
construction industry, met with Willis about bidding to build 
an entrance for Southgate Crossing.  Pollara reviewed the 
McCarthy schematics and informed Willis that they were 
incomplete and that it would be difficult to make a bid based 
on them.  Pollara nevertheless submitted a bid in August 2008 
                                                                                                     
investor group through a holding company called SDG 
Venture Holdings.   
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and Cheng called him to talk about it.  She told Pollara it was 
“her money” at stake and that she handled money for foreign 
investors.  (App. at 584-85.)  She further told Pollara he 
would also be dealing with Mait Dubois, her associate.  
Cheng later asked Pollara to undertake the entrance 
construction job.   
 
 Accordingly, Pollara submitted a scope-of-work letter.  
Willis told him that “Lucy [Cheng] is the person who will 
approve any written agreement … .”  (App. at 311.)  Cheng, 
Dubois, and Willis all told Pollara that the necessary building 
permits for the entrance had been obtained and that the 
project was “ready to go.”  (App. at 509, 590-91, 594-95.)  
Pollara heard the same thing from Kima Merrick, who was an 
office worker on the project for a time but was, for reasons 
unclear in the record, terminated.  On September 6, 2008, 
Pollara signed a contract with “Southgate Crossing” to 
construct the entrance for $193,000.  (App. at 1198.)  At some 
later point, Willis – acting under Cheng’s instructions and 
unbeknownst to Pollara – changed the contract to designate 
“Southgate Development Group, LLC” as the contracting 
entity.  (App. at 594, 1198.)  In actuality, the investors did not 
approve the creation of SDG until November 2008.  When he 
signed the contract, Pollara was unaware that the project had 
not been permitted.6   
 
 Pollara began work on the entrance in September 
2008.  On September 18, the Virgin Islands Department of 
                                              
 6 If he did not at least suspect a problem with permits, 
however, it would be puzzling, given his many years of 
construction experience and his own earlier comments to 
Willis about the incomplete nature of the schematics. 
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Planning and Natural Resources (the “Department of 
Planning”) served Pollara with a “stop notice” and a cease-
and-desist order for failing to obtain required permits for the 
work.  (App. at 591-92, 598.)  When Pollara called Cheng 
about the stop order, she initially told him that “we have a 
permit” (App. at 599), but eventually she asked him to obtain 
the necessary government approvals.  When he informed her 
that doing so was outside the scope of their contract, she 
offered to pay for the additional work.  Pollara retained 
McCarthy to provide appropriate plans for the entrance so 
that he could submit them to the Department of Planning.  
The permitting process also required Pollara to add electrical, 
plumbing, and irrigation features that were not covered by the 
initial construction contract.  Moreover, Pollara had to 
perform additional landscaping, in keeping with the newly 
prepared plans.  He eventually succeeded in getting an earth-
change permit, a flood hazard permit, an electrical permit, 
and a building permit.  
  
 In October, construction hit a setback when the 
roadway in front of Southgate Crossing was “washed out 
completely” by heavy rains.  (App. at 515.)  Cheng and 
Dubois instructed Pollara to repair the roadway, stating that 
they would pay for it, even though Pollara could not provide a 
cost estimate for the repairs.  After Pollara sent the first 
invoice for his work, Cheng told him to bill SDG, rather than 
Southgate Crossing, LLC, because SDG was, as she put it, 
“the company with the money.”  (App. at 595.)  Cheng 
explained that SDG was funded by OMEI and that “she 
controlled the money.”  (Id.)  When Pollara questioned the 
payment process, he was told by Cheng’s accountant that 
Cheng approved all payment requests because it was her 
money.  Thus, when Pollara prepared the invoice for the 
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roadwork, it read “[c]ost of road repair as per agreement with 
investors” and listed charges of $37,483.  (App. at 1452.)  
  
 At some point, Dubois and Cheng asked Pollara to 
obtain the permits that would allow the development of 
approximately 200 townhomes on the Southgate Crossing 
property.  Pollara believed he could do so because he had a 
good relationship with the Department of Planning, and he 
agreed to do so because Cheng and Dubois offered him a 
dramatically new deal: they would make Pollara a 25% owner 
of the development project.  The plan was – or so Pollara 
thought – to build about 200 townhouses in a gated 
community and to market and sell them.  Dubois showed 
Pollara a spreadsheet forecasting a $20 million profit on a 
$100 million project, with Pollara having a 25% equity stake.  
  
 Later, Willis told Pollara that the investors might want 
to sell a few parcels of the property.  Pollara became 
concerned that such sales would create the appearance that 
the developers simply wanted to “flip” the property, i.e., sell 
it off without actually adding development, which would 
upset the Department of Planning and the Governor because 
they “truly believe[d]” in the project.  (App. at 612, 1364.)  
Cheng and Pollara also exchanged emails about the lack of 
cash in SDG’s bank account and the fact that SDG required a 
capital infusion from Cheng’s investors.  To conceal her true 
motives, Cheng told Pollara that she was keeping SDG’s 
account empty because she feared that Merrick, the one-time 
office worker on the project, might sue for wrongful 
termination.  Cheng promised that she would move funds 
around from other accounts in order to pay for the 
construction work.  Pollara thus hired and paid for 
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engineering and survey work on the project and also paid for 
McCarthy’s planning and design services.  
    
 While Cheng and Dubois reassured Pollara that they 
were committed to developing Southgate Crossing, they were, 
in reality, planning to wait for a time and then flip the 
property rather than develop it.  Pollara stated that, had he 
known their true intentions, he would not have gotten 
involved with them.  He thought that he was participating in a 
real project that would create jobs and develop the land.  
  
 To keep Pollara involved, Cheng and Dubois 
continued to tell him that the development of Southgate 
Crossing was proceeding as planned.  And, Pollara continued 
actively working on the project, often 12 hours a day or 
longer, and expending money.  Around December 8, 2008, 
Dubois sent to Cheng an email relaying that Pollara was 
doing extra work – such as completing a cost detail 
spreadsheet and providing model construction costs – free of 
charge because he believed he was receiving a 25% equity 
stake in a real development.  Dubois acknowledged in the 
email that he knew that Cheng and the other investors simply 
wanted to sell the property and that they lacked the financing 
to proceed with the project.  He also suggested telling Pollara 
that they were underfunded, but he did not do that.  Instead, 
on December 21, 2008, he sent Pollara another email telling 
him how much they appreciated his efforts and that, because 
the investors initially agreed only to finance the purchase and 
permitting of the land, the creation of a separate development 
company with additional financing was necessary.  He 
admitted that the billing procedures needed streamlining and 
that they were unprepared for the scope of Southgate 
Crossing, but he promised that, if Pollara would continue to 
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work with them, they would all “make a lot of money.”  
(App. at 1410-11.)  Pollara continued working on the project.   
 
 On February 5, 2009, Cheng sent an email to Dubois 
saying that she wanted to “just complete the entrance and 
[landscaping] and put up the project for sale” because she 
“[could] not deal with [Pollara’s] style or any other builders 
in St. Croix.”  (App. at 1414.)  Dubois responded that, even 
though they were planning to sell, they “need[ed] to keep 
[Pollara] moving forward (ESPECIALLY UNTIL WE GET 
THE PERMIT).”  (App. at 1413 (emphasis in original).)  The 
next week, Cheng proposed cutting off payments to Pollara 
because SDG and Ocean View were short on money, but 
Dubois argued that, since the investor group approved the 
expenditures and since Willis, Cheng, and Dubois approved 
the work and costs, it was not “fair” to “simply ... cut[]off the 
funding.”  (App. at 1416.)  Dubois went on to ask “[w]hy not 
let [Pollara] continue to think he is going to do the project and 
continue to be supportive of us instead of getting him mad[?]”  
(Id.)  Later, Dubois emailed Cheng and Willis that “I would 
like to [communicate to Pollara that] we still wanted to be in 
the deal.”  (App. at 1419.)  At trial, the following exchange 
revealed Dubois’s mindset: 
 
[Counsel for Pollara:] [W]hy would you 
intentionally misrepresent to [Pollara] that you 
were still in the deal when you knew you 
weren’t? 
 
[Dubois:] All I was trying to do was get the gate 
completed.   
 
(App. at 874.) 
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In March, Cheng and Dubois stopped paying Pollara’s 
invoices for raw costs and locked him out of his office at the 
development site.  Additionally, Pollara was never paid for 
the repair work to the roadway after the flooding in October 
2008.  Although there was some evidence that Willis was 
interested in saving the project, Cheng and Dubois had 
decided to have Ocean View foreclose on the property, thus 
eliminating Willis’s interest and destroying any interest that 
Pollara could claim.  Cheng and Dubois, standing on both 
sides of the financing, refused any extension of the financing 
terms and withheld their consent to selling the development at 
a profit to a buyer whom Willis had found.  Instead, they 
caused Ocean View to foreclose on the land, acquiring the 
property free of Willis’s and Pollara’s interests.  On April 14, 
2009, Pollara wrote a demand letter to Cheng and Dubois for 
approximately $201,000 (representing $159,894.57 in unpaid 
invoices and about $41,000 for repair work to the roadway).  
Pollara placed a construction lien on the property, listing 
Cheng and Dubois as his contracting counterparties.   
 
 B.  Procedural History 
 
 On June 3, 2009, Pollara and his construction 
company7 filed suit against SDG, Southgate Crossing, LLC, 
and Ocean View in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, 
alleging that they owed him $201,000 under a theory of 
quantum meruit.  Pollara later stipulated to the dismissal of 
Southgate Crossing, LLC and SDG.  Ocean View then timely 
                                              
 7 For ease of reference, “Pollara” will from this point 
be used to refer collectively to Mr. Pollara and his business 
entity, Frank C. Pollara Group, LLC. 
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removed the case to the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  
Pollara amended his complaint in 2010 to add OMEI, Cheng, 
and Dubois as defendants and to add a claim for unjust 
enrichment.  In 2011, Pollara amended the complaint a 
second time to add a claim for intentional or negligent 
misrepresentation.  At the conclusion of discovery, the 
Appellants moved for summary judgment, arguing that they 
had no contract with Pollara and, in fact, had nothing to do 
with the project, other than insofar as Cheng and Dubois were 
acting on behalf of the contracting entities Southgate 
Crossing, LLC and SDG.  They further argued that the 
existence of a written contract with Pollara – though they 
disclaimed being any part of it – barred the quantum meruit 
and unjust enrichment claims.  The Appellants also raised the 
“gist-of-the-action doctrine” as a defense to Pollara’s 
misrepresentation claims, saying that there could be no tort 
claims because “any misrepresentations regarding payments 
to plaintiffs arise out of the contractual duty to pay them.”  
(App. at 1599 (emphasis in original).)  The District Court 
denied the summary judgment motion, holding that the 
Appellants could not invoke a contract defense, such as the 
gist-of-the-action doctrine, when they expressly disclaimed 
the contract itself.  Frank [C.] Pollara Grp., LLC v. Ocean 
View Inv. Holding,  LLC, No. 9-60, 2013 WL 171087, at *2-4 
(D.V.I. Jan. 10, 2013).  
  
 By the time the case proceeded to trial, the parties had 
agreed to a verdict form which listed five subjects about 
which the Appellants had purportedly made 
misrepresentations: (1) the original building permit for the 
entrance, (2) the additional work for the entrance, (3) the 
roadway repair work, (4) various permits for construction of 
group dwellings, and (5) the proposals for the development 
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plan.  Jurors were asked to identify for each of the Appellants, 
using a chart, whether that specific party had made an 
intentional misrepresentation, a negligent misrepresentation, 
or no misrepresentation at all concerning each of those 
subjects.  The jury found that Ocean View and Cheng had 
made intentional misrepresentations and that OMEI had made 
negligent misrepresentations as to every subject.  It found that 
Dubois had made negligent misrepresentations with respect to 
the original building permit and the proposals for the 
development plan, and intentional misrepresentations as to 
the other three subjects.  The jury awarded Pollara 
compensatory damages of $391,626 from all of the 
Appellants and punitive damages totaling $90,000 against 
Cheng, Ocean View, and Dubois.  The Appellants timely 
filed a motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 59, claiming insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict and damages, and a motion for judgment as a matter 
of law challenging the sufficiency of the evidence under Rule 
50(b).8  The Rule 50(b) motion was the renewal of a timely 
Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law that the 
Appellants had made at the close of Pollara’s case-in-chief.  
They did not renew their gist-of-the-action defense in those 
motions, which the District Court had earlier addressed in the 
order denying summary judgment.  The District Court denied 
the post trial motions and this appeal followed.  Frank C. 
Pollara Grp., LLC v. Ocean View Inv. Holding LLC, No. 9-
60, 2013 WL 5992629 (D.V.I. Nov. 12, 2013).   
 
                                              
 8 All references herein to a “Rule” are to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.  
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II.  Discussion9  
 
 The Appellants challenge the District Court’s denial of 
their motion for summary judgment and what they perceive to 
be an inconsistency in the verdict.  We discuss their 
arguments on each of those subjects.10   
                                              
 9 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1332 and 1441.  To the extent that we have jurisdiction, it 
is pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In deciding an appeal 
involving a motion for judgment as a matter of law, we view 
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party and give that party the advantage of every fair and 
reasonable inference.  Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., 554 F.3d 
426, 433 (3d Cir. 2009).  “[W]e must refrain from weighing 
the evidence, determining the credibility of witnesses, or 
substituting our own version of the facts for that of the jury.”  
Id. (quoting Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 300 
(3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Likewise, 
in reviewing an appeal from the denial of a motion for a new 
trial, “we must view the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party.”  Grazier ex rel. White v. City of 
Phila., 328 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Caruolo v. 
John Crane, Inc., 226 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 
 10 We do not, however, give a detailed discussion of 
other arguments they raise.  Although Appellants’ gist-of-the-
action claims were not the subject of Rule 50 motions, they 
did make both Rule 50 and Rule 59 challenges to the 
sufficiency of the evidence on other issues.  Viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to Pollara as we must, 
see supra n.9, it is beyond serious dispute that the record 
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 A.  Summary Judgment 
 
 The Appellants argue that their summary judgment 
motion based on the gist-of-the-action defense should have 
been granted by the District Court.11  As a threshold matter, 
we must decide whether the order denying summary 
judgment is reviewable, since the Appellants did not renew 
their argument in Rule 50 motions for judgment as a matter of 
law.  Given governing precedent from the Supreme Court, it 
has become apparent that when, as in this instance, a 
summary judgment motion does not present a pure issue of 
law and the issues it does present have not been raised and 
renewed by proper motions for judgment as a matter of law 
under Rule 50, those issues are not reviewable on appeal. 
                                                                                                     
adequately supports the jury’s verdict on each issue they 
raise.  Accordingly, we do not need to discuss Appellants’ 
myriad challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence 
supporting the jury’s verdict.  
 
 11 Pollara urges us to hold that the gist-of-the-action 
doctrine does not apply under the law of the Virgin Islands.  
Pollara offers no argument or briefing in furtherance of that 
contention and it is contrary to our existing precedent.  See 
Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 868 n.7 (3d Cir. 2013) (Roth, 
J.) (“[W]e hold today, the gist of the action doctrine applies 
under Virgin Islands law.”).  More importantly, the Supreme 
Court of the Virgin Islands has recently held that the gist-of-
the-action (or barred-by-contract) doctrine does apply in the 
Virgin Islands.  Cacciamani and Rover Corp. v. Banco 
Popular de Puerto Rico, S.CT.CIV. No. 2013-0063, 2014 
WL 4262098, at *3 (V.I. Aug. 29, 2014).  
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 In Ortiz v. Jordan, the Supreme Court observed that, 
generally, a party may not appeal an order denying summary 
judgment after a full trial on the merits.  562 U.S. 180 (2011).  
“[O]rders denying summary judgment do not qualify as ‘final 
decisions’ subject to appeal.”  Id. at 188.  Rather, such an 
order “retains its interlocutory character as simply a step 
along the route to final judgment.”  Id. at 184.  “Once the case 
proceeds to trial, the full record developed in court supersedes 
the record existing at the time of the summary judgment 
motion.”  Id.  There is an exception to this general rule, 
however, for an order denying summary judgment on “a 
purely legal issue” capable of resolution “with reference only 
to undisputed facts.”  Id. at 190 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  See also, e.g., Stampf v. Long Island R. Co., 761 
F.3d 192, 201 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (noting that Ortiz leaves 
open a narrow exception for purely legal questions); Nolfi v. 
Ohio Ky. Oil Corp., 675 F.3d 538, 545 (6th Cir. 2012) 
(same); Copar Pumice Co., Inc. v. Morris, 639 F.3d 1025, 
1031 (10th Cir. 2011) (same); Owatonna Clinic–Mayo Health 
Sys. v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 639 F.3d 
806, 809-10 (8th Cir. 2011) (same).  To qualify as an 
appealable order, a district court’s summary judgment ruling 
cannot turn on “what occurred, or why an action was taken or 
omitted, but [must relate to] disputes about the substance and 
clarity of pre-existing law.”  Winfield v. Trottier, 710 F.3d 49, 
53 (2d Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Accordingly, because Appellants did not 
include their gist-of-the-action argument in their motions for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50, we may only 
review that argument now if it presents a purely legal 
question.  
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 The gist-of-the-action doctrine is a theory under 
common law “designed to maintain the conceptual distinction 
between breach of contract claims and tort claims.”  eToll, 
Inc. v. Elias/Savion Adver., Inc., 811 A.2d 10, 14 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2002).12  It is policy-based, arising out of the concern that 
tort recovery should not be permitted for breaches of contract.  
Glazer v. Chandler, 200 A.2d 416, 418 (Pa. 1964).  “[W]hile 
the existence of a contractual relationship between two parties 
does not prevent one party from bringing a tort claim against 
another, the gist of the action doctrine precludes tort suits for 
the mere breach of contractual duties”; the plaintiff must 
instead point to independent events giving rise to the tort.  
Addie v. Kjaer, 737 F.3d 854, 865-66 (3d Cir. 2013).  Thus, 
“[a]pplication of this doctrine frequently requires courts to 
engage in a factually intensive inquiry as to the nature of a 
plaintiff’s claims.”  Id. at 868.   
 
 In Pediatrix Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem International, 
Inc., a case that preceded the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Ortiz, the plaintiff, Pediatrix, had filed a motion to dismiss 
defendant TeleChem’s counterclaims.  602 F.3d 541, 544 (3d 
                                              
 12 Pennsylvania law is instructive in interpreting the 
gist-of-the-action doctrine in the Virgin Islands.  See, e.g., 
Jefferson v. Bay Isles Assocs., L.L.L.P., No. ST-09-CV-186, 
2011 WL 3853332, at *10 (V.I. Super. Feb. 1, 2011) (relying 
on Pennsylvania law in applying gist-of-the-action doctrine); 
see also Addie, 737 F.3d at 868 n.7 (stating in a case 
governed by Virgin Islands law that “[P]rior cases from this 
Court and the courts of Pennsylvania analyzing the [gist-of-
the-action] doctrine are instructive in determining the 
application of the doctrine to individuals acting on behalf of a 
contracting party.”).  
 18 
 
Cir. 2010).  In that motion, Pediatrix asserted the gist-of-the-
action defense, but the motion was denied and the case went 
to trial.  Id.  After trial, Pediatrix moved for a new trial under 
Rule 59, arguing that the district court had wrongly decided 
the motion to dismiss and that the gist-of-the-action defense 
should have applied.  Id. at 544-45.  The district court denied 
that motion too.  Then, on appeal, TeleChem argued that 
Pediatrix had waived its challenge to the district court’s ruling 
on the gist-of-the-action defense because Pediatrix had failed 
to raise it in motions for judgment as a matter of law under 
Rule 50.  Id. at 545. A divided panel of this Court held that 
the applicability of the gist-of-the-action defense was a legal 
issue and thus was sufficiently preserved for appellate review 
because the argument had been raised in the earlier motion to 
dismiss.  Id. at 546-47 (“The issue here is whether the 
misrepresentation claim, even if supported by sufficient 
evidence, is nevertheless precluded by the gist of the action 
doctrine.  That legal dispute is clearly set forth in Pediatrix’s 
Rule 12(b)(6) motion... .”); but see id. at 551 (Jordan, J., 
dissenting) (“[A] Rule 50 motion may very well be required 
[to preserve an issue for appeal] when a legal question 
depends on the resolution of factual issues, such that the legal 
question cannot be resolved without reference to the evidence 
amassed at trial.”).  
 
 The next year, the Supreme Court decided Ortiz, 
which emphasized that, when a legal issue initially raised at 
summary judgment – in that case, qualified immunity – 
depends on the resolution of factual questions, motions for 
judgment as a matter of law under Rules 50(a) and (b) are 
indeed required to preserve the legal issue for appellate 
review.  562 U.S. at 182-84.  Ortiz involved a former prison 
inmate who brought civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 
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§ 1983 against various prison officials.  Id. at 182-83.  The 
prison officials moved for summary judgment, asserting 
qualified immunity as a defense, and the district court denied 
the motion.  Id.  The officials filed a motion for judgment as a 
matter of law at the close of evidence, but did not renew their 
motion after the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff.  Id. at 
187.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
determined that, when a summary judgment motion is 
grounded on a claim of qualified immunity, the denial of that 
motion is reviewable.  See Ortiz v. Jordan, 316 F. App’x 449, 
453 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that a “denial of summary 
judgment based on qualified immunity is an exception to th[e] 
rule” that “courts normally do not review the denial of a 
summary judgment motion after a trial on the merits”).  The 
Supreme Court reversed.  Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 183-84.  
Notwithstanding that qualified immunity is frequently 
described as a question of law,13 the Supreme Court ruled that 
the “[defendants’] failure to renew their motion for judgment 
as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
50(b) left the appellate forum with no warrant” to review the 
denial of summary judgment because the “officials’ claims of 
                                              
 13 See Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 
316 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The issue of qualified immunity is 
generally a question of law... .”); Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 
199, 211 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[W]hether an officer made a 
reasonable mistake of law and is thus entitled to qualified 
immunity is a question of law that is properly answered by 
the court, not a jury.”); cf. Monteiro v. City of Elizabeth, 436 
F.3d 397, 405 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Although qualified immunity 
is a question of law determined by the Court, when qualified 
immunity depends on disputed issues of fact, those issues 
must be determined by the jury.”).  
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qualified immunity hardly present purely legal issues capable 
of resolution with reference only to undisputed facts.”  Id. at 
185, 190 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Court 
reasoned that, when a litigant’s summary judgment motion is 
denied and the case proceeds to a full trial on the merits, the 
summary judgment record becomes displaced by the trial 
record and the summary judgment ruling is no longer 
reviewable.  Id. at 184.  The message was that a litigant must 
ordinarily renew any objection to the denial of summary 
judgment through Rule 50 challenges both at and after trial.  
Id. at 190-92. 
 
 In light of Ortiz, it is clear that, if an earlier dispositive 
argument is not renewed through motions for judgment as a 
matter of law under Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b), the litigant 
propounding the argument may not seek appellate review of a 
decision rejecting it, unless that argument presents a pure 
question of law that can be decided with reference only to 
undisputed facts.  To the extent our decision in Pediatrix 
suggests otherwise, it has been overruled by Ortiz.  While we 
are mindful that “[i]t would be unfair to ... penalize [a 
litigant] for failing to jump up and down or labor an 
objection” that is already a part of the record, Bohler-
Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 247 F.3d 79, 109 
(3d Cir. 2001), it is not unfair to make litigants deal with the 
full record.  Again, “[o]nce the case proceeds to trial, the full 
record developed in court supersedes the record existing at 
the time of the summary judgment motion.”  Ortiz, 562 U.S. 
at 184.  Insofar as an issue has a factual component, the 
failure to raise the issue in motions for judgment as a matter 
of law at and after trial makes it inappropriate for an appellate 
court to address what should have been directed to “the judge 
who saw and heard the witnesses and had the feel of the case 
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which no appellate printed transcript can impart.”  Id. at 185 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).   
 
 The failure to preserve arguments in properly filed 
Rule 50 motions is particularly vexing when, as is often the 
case, a litigant is really challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence.  Cf. Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 190 (despite prison officials’ 
insistence “that sufficiency of the evidence is not what is at 
stake in this case[,]” their claims of qualified immunity 
implicated factual issues); Pediatrix, 602 F.3d at 552 (Jordan, 
J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems that Pediatrix is really saying that 
it is entitled to judgment in its favor … because there was 
insufficient evidence at trial to establish any fraud 
independent of the parties’ contractual relationship.  That is 
an argument that could have, and should have, been raised at 
trial.  Because it was not, it has been waived.”).  Ortiz 
clarified that only “neat abstract issues of law” fit the 
exception to the rule requiring that arguments be preserved in 
Rule 50 motions.  Ortiz, 562 U.S. at 191 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  Cases in which the facts that could render an 
actor answerable for his conduct are disputed or in which 
questions exist as to what occurred simply do not fit.  Id. 
 
 With that framework in mind, we turn to whether the 
applicability of the gist-of-the-action defense in this case 
presents a purely legal question or whether it necessarily 
involves reference to disputed facts.  The District Court held 
that the defense did not apply because the parties were not in 
privity.  That ruling, however, was couched in the language of 
estoppel – that is, the Court’s essential holding was that, 
because the Appellants denied being bound by the contract, 
they could not simultaneously argue for contractual 
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protections.14  Cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone 
Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 187, 
200 (3d Cir. 2001) (“To allow [a non-signatory] to claim the 
benefit of the contract and simultaneously avoid its burdens 
would … disregard equity... .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
 
 The Appellants argue that the District Court’s 
reasoning is grounded in an erroneous belief that the gist-of-
the-action doctrine can apply only to a contract’s signatories, 
in contravention of our decision in Addie v. Kjaer.  See 737 
                                              
 14  In pertinent part, the Court held that,  
 
[Appellants] do not assert that they are in 
contractual privity with [Pollara] by virtue of 
the entrance/gate agreement. To the contrary, 
they affirmatively disown the written 
agreement, arguing that the contracting parties 
are not defendants to this action, and that 
[Pollara] ha[s] not sued “either of the two 
parties with which they contracted.” Indeed, in 
their affidavits, they disavow taking action on 
behalf of the contracting non-parties.  
Accordingly, accepting these representations, 
[Pollara] cannot sue them pursuant to the 
written contract; the contract does not define 
these parties’ respective rights and duties.  
 
Frank [C.] Pollara Grp. LLC v. Ocean View Inv. Holding, 
LLC, No. 9-60, 2013 WL 171087, at *3 (D.V.I. Jan. 10, 
2013).  
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F.3d at 868-69 (“Although D’Amour was not a party to the 
contracts, the Buyers cannot detach D’Amour from his status 
as agent for Premier. ... We therefore hold that the gist of the 
action doctrine bars the tort claims Buyers asserted against 
D’Amour, all of which were based upon conduct that 
allegedly breached the contracts.”).  It is the Appellants, 
though, who are laboring under a misperception.  They claim 
to be entitled to the benefit of the gist-of-the-action defense 
because somewhere in the factual mix of the case there was a 
contract, even though Pollara claimed it did not govern the 
disputes in question and the Appellants actively disavowed it.  
The Appellants are wrong, and Addie is no support for their 
position.  In Addie, we made a “factually intensive inquiry” 
into the contracts at issue and the relationships between the 
parties and concluded that, although a particular litigant was 
not a signatory to the contract, he was the sole principal and 
shareholder for the signatory and thus was both bound and 
protected by the contracts.  Id. at 867-69.  Addie does not 
stand for the proposition that a plaintiff who has entered into 
a contract is barred from bringing tort claims against a third 
party who disclaims the contract, nor does it suggest that 
whether someone is bound by a contract is a purely legal 
question.  On the contrary, Addie reaffirms that whether a 
contract governs a particular dispute is often a “factually 
intensive” question.  Id. at 868.  Indeed, that is one reason 
why a number of district courts in this Circuit have been 
rightly reluctant to apply the gist-of-the-action doctrine when 
the existence of a contract is still in controversy.15 
                                              
  15 See M.H. Rydek Elecs., LLC v. Zober Indus., Inc., 
No. CIV.A.07-3885, 2007 WL 3407130, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 15, 2007) (gist-of-the-action doctrine does not apply 
where existence of contract is unsettled); see also Bengal 
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In the present case, the existence of contractual privity 
depends on certain predicate facts which, contrary to the 
Appellants’ contentions, were vigorously disputed.  Pollara 
claimed that the contract at issue did not extend to extra work 
he performed based on the Appellants’ misrepresentations.  
The Appellants’ argument, embodied in their summary 
judgment motion, was that Cheng and DuBois were not 
responsible for the conduct of the mortgage lender, Ocean 
View, and the mortgage holder, Southgate Crossing, LLC.  
The scope of the contract and the degree to which Cheng and 
Dubois pulled the strings of the entity-Appellants were fact 
questions bearing on the issue of contractual privity, and 
Pollara argued as much in opposing summary judgment.  The 
District Court heard those competing arguments and ruled 
that the Appellants were not entitled to invoke the gist-of-the-
action defense because they insisted that they were not bound 
by the contract.  We are bound to note simply that the 
Appellants failed to preserve their objections to the District 
Court’s summary judgment ruling with motions for judgment 
as a matter of law under Rule 50, and they thus have lost their 
ability to raise them now. 
 
                                                                                                     
Converting Servs., Inc. v. Dual Printing, Inc., No. CIV.A. 11-
6375, 2012 WL 831965, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2012) 
(suggesting that denial of contract’s existence would be 
sufficient to defeat gist-of-the-action defense); DeAngelo 
Bros., Inc. v. Long, No. 4:05-CV-0800, 2005 WL 1309037, at 
*4 (M.D. Pa. June 1, 2005) (gist-of-the-action inapplicable 
where contract is in question).   
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 B.  Inconsistent Verdicts  
 
 The Appellants also complain that the jury’s verdict 
was inconsistent because its finding of intentional 
misrepresentation by Cheng precludes a finding of negligent 
misrepresentation by OMEI.  As already noted, the jury was 
asked to decide the degree of fault for Ocean View, OMEI, 
Cheng, and Dubois with respect to five different subjects, 
indicating whether there was an intentional misrepresentation, 
negligent misrepresentation, or no misrepresentation at all 
with respect to each of those subjects.16  The Appellants argue 
that, because the jury assigned different degrees of fault to 
different actors, the verdict was irreparably inconsistent.   
   
 Under Rule 49, a jury may render either a general 
verdict or a special verdict.17  A general verdict is a “verdict 
                                              
 16 As explained supra at 11-12, the five subjects about 
which the Appellants had purportedly made 
misrepresentations were: (1) the original building permit for 
the entrance, (2) the additional work for the entrance, (3) the 
roadway repair work, (4) various permits for construction of 
group dwellings, and (5) the proposals for the development 
plan.  (App. at 5.)   
 
 17 Rule 49 provides, in pertinent part, that  
 
The court may require a jury to return only a 
special verdict in the form of a special written 
finding on each issue of fact.  The court may do 
so by:  (A) submitting written questions 
susceptible of a categorical or other brief 
answer; (B) submitting written forms of the 
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by which the jury finds in favor of one party or the other, as 
opposed to resolving specific fact questions.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary 1555 (10th ed. 2014).  By contrast, a “special 
verdict” is a form where the jury answers only “special 
written finding[s] on each issue of fact.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
49(a)(1).  The jury’s sole function is to determine the facts; 
the jury needs no instruction on the law because the court 
applies the law to the facts as found by the jury.  See Portage 
II v. Bryant Petroleum Corp., 899 F.2d 1514, 1521 (6th Cir. 
1990) (“Where special verdicts are involved, the jury’s sole 
function is to determine the facts; therefore, neither an 
instruction on the law nor a summary concerning their role in 
relation to the law was necessary.”); see also 89 C.J.S. Trial 
§ 773 (2015) (“If special issues are submitted or a special 
verdict is required, it is improper to instruct the jury on the 
law of the case.”).  A “general verdict with answers to written 
questions” is a hybrid form in which the jury is asked to 
                                                                                                     
special findings that might properly be made 
under the pleadings and evidence; or  (C) using 
any other method that the court considers 
appropriate.  ...  
 
The court may submit to the jury forms for a 
general verdict, together with written questions 
on one or more issues of fact that the jury must 
decide. The court must give the instructions and 
explanations necessary to enable the jury to 
render a general verdict and answer the 
questions in writing, and must direct the jury to 
do both. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)(1), (b)(1).  
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render a general verdict in conjunction with findings of fact.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b)(1).  In other words, the jury is asked to 
decide mixed questions of law and fact, with the guidance of 
legal instructions.  Id.; see also McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear 
Shaper Co., 786 F.2d 592, 595 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (quoting 
requirements of Rule 49(b)); Stanton by Brooks v. Astra 
Pharm. Prods., Inc., 718 F.2d 553, 574-75 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(analyzing whether questions were submitted to jury under 
Rule 49(a) or (b)).   
 
Here, the verdict form did not require the jury to make 
special written findings as to questions of fact, but rather 
asked the jury to check a box indicating whether a particular 
defendant was liable for misrepresentation, and, if so, based 
on what type of misrepresentation: negligent or intentional.  
Accordingly, it is best understood as a general verdict form 
with special questions.  See Lavoie v. Pac. Press & Shear 
Co., 975 F.2d 48, 54 (2d Cir. 1992) (form asking jury whether 
defendant was liable under each of four alternative theories 
constituted general verdicts on different legal theories).  The 
District Court’s instructions to the jury on the law to be 
applied to the factual findings, as well as the requirement that 
the jury apply the law and render its verdict, provide further 
support – and may conclusively establish – that this was a 
general verdict.  Jarvis v. Ford Motor Co., 283 F.3d 33, 56 
(2d Cir. 2002) (Rule 49(a) special verdict rule is inapplicable 
when a jury is required to make a determination of ultimate 
liability as well as to determine facts).  
 
Our court has never expressly decided whether the 
failure to object to an inconsistency in a general verdict 
before the jury is discharged results in a waiver of the 
objection.  In Simmons v. City of Philadelphia, Judge Becker 
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predicted that, “[i]n this circuit, it probably is necessary, as it 
is in the majority of the circuits, to raise prior to the jury’s 
dismissal an objection based on the inconsistency of the 
answers to interrogatories supporting a general verdict 
rendered under Rule 49(b).”  947 F.2d 1042, 1056-57 (3d Cir. 
1991).  Later, in Loughman v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal 
Company, we noted that we did not need to decide whether to 
adopt that “tentative conclusion” from Simmons because the 
verdict in Loughman was not inconsistent.  6 F.3d 88, 104 
n.15 (3d Cir. 1993).  Here, it is uncontested that the 
Appellants failed to object either to the wording on the 
verdict form – indeed, they joined in proposing it – or to the 
responses provided by the jury before the jury was 
discharged.  Therefore, fulfilling Judge Becker’s prediction, 
we today join a number of our sister circuits and hold that, if 
a party fails to object to an inconsistency in a general verdict 
before the jury is excused, that party waives any objection in 
that regard.18  Having decided that, we choose not to consider 
                                              
18 See, e.g., Fencorp, Co. v. Ohio-Ky. Oil Corp., 675 
F.3d 933, 944 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Defendants failed to raise 
th[e] argument that the jury’s verdict was internally 
inconsistent before the jury was discharged and, 
consequently, have waived this objection.”); Walter Int’l 
Prods., Inc. v. Salinas, 650 F.3d 1402, 1419 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(“We have held that if the party challenging this type of 
verdict has failed to object before the jury is discharged, that 
party has waived the right to contest the verdicts on the basis 
of alleged inconsistency.” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Kosmynka v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 462 F.3d 74, 83 
(2d Cir. 2006) (“It is well established that a party waives its 
objection to any inconsistency in a jury verdict if it fails to 
object to the verdict prior to the excusing of the jury.”); 
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whether there is any inconsistency in the verdict.  Because the 
Appellants failed, before the jury was discharged, to object to 
the inconsistency they believed was inherent in the general 
verdict, they have waived that objection under Rule 49.19    
                                                                                                     
Chem-Trend, Inc. v. Newport Indus., Inc., 279 F.3d 625, 629 
(8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]o the extent Chem-Trend claims an 
inconsistency in the verdicts, Chem-Trend waived the 
challenge by failing to object before the district court 
discharged the jury.”); Babcock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 299 
F.3d 60, 63 (1st Cir. 2002) (“We have held that under Rule 
49(b), objections to the inconsistency of verdicts must be 
made after the verdict is read and before the jury is 
discharged.”); Austin v. Paramount Parks, Inc., 195 F.3d 715, 
726 (4th Cir. 1999) (“[A] litigant’s failure to raise an 
inconsistency before the jury is discharged renders Rule 49(b) 
inapplicable and thus precludes that litigant from relying 
upon the inconsistency to challenge an adverse disposition.”); 
Bonin v. Tour W., Inc., 896 F.2d 1260, 1263 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(“If a party fails to object before the jury is discharged, he 
waives any future challenge to the inconsistency because his 
failure to make a timely objection deprives the court of the 
option of sending the jury back for further deliberations.”).  
Cf. Hundley v. District of Columbia, 494 F.3d 1097, 1103 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff did not waive its 
inconsistency objection because it “repeatedly objected at 
trial to the proposed written interrogatory”). 
 
 19 The Appellants may also have waived their 
inconsistency-challenge pursuant to Rule 51 by failing to 
raise any objection to the content of the jury instructions and 
verdict form, both of which authorized the jury to make the 
findings that Appellants now complain are inconsistent.  See 
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III. Conclusion  
 
  The District Court’s denial of summary judgment is 
not reviewable.  In all other respects, we will affirm the 
rulings of the District Court. 
                                                                                                     
Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (addressing objections to jury instructions); 
Marra v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 497 F.3d 286, 312 n.21 (3d Cir. 
2007), as amended (Aug. 28, 2007)  (stating that there is a 
“strong case” that appellants waived any objection to 
inconsistency in verdict by failing to object to verdict form, 
but concluding that the verdict was consistent and thus that 
the panel need not decide the issue); Kosmynka, 462 F.3d at 
84-85 (“Waiver of an objection to an inconsistent verdict has 
been found ... when the inconsistency was caused by an 
improper jury instruction or verdict sheet and there was no 
objection to either the instruction or verdict sheet prior to 
submission of the case.”).  
